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When we make an inductive inference we use what 
we already know about the world to make a prediction 
about some novel event or object. One frequently studied 
type of inductive inference exploits our tendency to group 
events and objects into categories. Based on our knowl-
edge about the members of one category, we may be more 
or less confident that a feature known to be possessed 
by members of that category will also be possessed by 
members of another category. Thus, given that we know 
that dogs possess some property A, we might be relatively 
confident that wolves also possess the property but very 
unsure that goldfish have it. There are a variety of factors 
known to affect the strength of an inductive inference, and 
a variety of accounts of the operation of these factors have 
emerged in the literature (for a review see Heit, 2000). In 
this paper I will describe two individual differences stud-
ies of people’s sensitivity to some of these factors. The 
overall aim of these studies was to answer questions about 
how such sensitivity, where it exists, might best be cap-
tured by models of induction.
Category-based induction is most often studied using 
arguments such as 1 below. The statements above the line 
are the premises and the statement below the line is the 
conclusion. Typically, the predicate which participants are 
asked to project from the categories in the premises to the 
category in the conclusion is blank. The three character-
istics of inductive arguments that I will consider here are 
the amount and diversity of evidence in the premises and 
the nature of the conclusion. Consider Arguments 1 and 2. 
Experimental evidence (e.g., Osherson, Smith, Wilkie, 
López, & Shafir, 1990; Heit & Feeney, 2005) shows that 
people consider arguments such as 2 to be stronger than 
arguments such as 1. This effect is known as the diversity 
effect and it occurs because people prefer arguments from 
diverse or dissimilar evidence.
Cows have property X (Argument 1)
Horses have property X
All mammals have property X
Cows have property X (Argument 2)
Badgers have property X
All mammals have property X
It has also been shown that people have more confidence 
in conclusions that are supported by more evidence (e.g., 
Osherson et al., 1990; McDonald, Samuels, & Rispoli, 
1996). Thus, arguments such as 3 below are perceived to 
be stronger than those such as 2 or 1. This effect is known 
as the monotonicity effect and is related to demonstra-
tions in the literature of people’s sensitivity to sample size 
(e.g., Nisbett, Krantz, Jepson, & Kunda, 1983). Finally, 
the nature of the conclusion may also have an effect on 
people’s category-based inductive inferences. Consider 
Argument 4 below, which differs from Argument 2 by vir-
tue of the greater specificity of its conclusion. Findings 
from adults (McDonald et al., 1996) and children (López, 
Gelman, Gutheil, & Smith, 1992) suggest that the speci-
ficity of the conclusion of an argument affects people’s in-
ductive inferences. In particular, while López et al. found 
no sensitivity to diversity and monotonicity in 5-year-old 
children, they observed sensitivity to these characteris-
tics in 8-year-olds but only for arguments with general 
conclusions. More recent work (Heit & Hahn, 2001) has 
succeeded in demonstrating sensitivity to diversity in chil-
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López et al. (1992) have explained the developmen-
tal trends that they observed in children’s induction in 
terms of the SCM. According to them, 5-year-olds do not 
display sensitivity to diversity and monotonicity because 
they do not calculate coverage. Instead, they rely on av-
erage, rather than maximum, similarity calculations. By 
age 8, children are held to be able to consider coverage, 
but they are unable to generate an inclusive category. 
Hence, although they are sensitive to the amount and di-
versity of evidence for arguments with general conclu-
sions, they are not similarly sensitive for arguments with 
specific conclusions. Certainly, the finding that similarity 
is basic is interesting from an associative point of view. 
Nonetheless, López et al.’s other findings are problematic 
for the FBM.
The first aim of the studies to be described here was 
to examine whether the finding from the developmental 
literature, that diversity and monotonicity effects are less 
likely to be observed with specific conclusions (López 
et al., 1992), will generalize to adults. There is some sug-
gestive evidence that this might be the case. Osherson 
et al. (1990) observed less sensitivity to both diversity 
and monotonicity for arguments with specific rather than 
general conclusions. However, the differences due to con-
clusion specificity were small, and Osherson et al.’s study 
contained only one item per condition. In the studies to be 
described here, participants received six items per condi-
tion. If, as might be predicted on the basis of Osherson 
et al.’s results, adult participants are less likely to display 
diversity and monotonicity effects with specific conclu-
sions, this would favor the SCM over the FBM.
A second aim of these studies is to examine category-
based induction in the context of the argument that there 
are two processes for thinking (Evans & Over, 1996; Slo-
man, 1996; Stanovich, 1999). The first type of process 
(Type 1) is said to be fast, massively parallel, associa-
tive and unrelated to working memory while the second 
type (Type 2) is slow, sequential, symbol manipulating 
and constrained by general cognitive resources such as 
working memory. In general, Type 1 processes are said to 
be sensitive to belief and context, while Type 2 processes 
are sensitive to abstract structure. Sloman (1996) has ar-
gued that category-based induction is a good example of 
a thinking task achieved primarily (but not always, see 
Sloman, 1998) via Type 1 processes.
There is converging evidence for a dissociation between 
types of thinking along these lines (for reviews see Evans, 
2003; Osman, 2004). From our current point of view, the 
most interesting evidence for a dissociation between dif-
ferent processes for thinking comes from work exploiting 
the difference between the degree to which each process 
is said to be constrained by general cognitive resources. 
Stanovich (1999) argues that as Type 2 processes are 
reliant on general cognitive resources such as working 
memory whereas Type 1 processes are not, positive as-
sociations between measures of cognitive ability and nor-
matively correct performance on primary thinking tasks 
should be interpreted as suggesting that Type 2 processes 
are necessary for such performance.
dren as young as 5. However, conclusion specificity was 
not manipulated in that work. At least in children, it ap-
pears that particular reasoning phenomena are less likely 
to be observed for arguments with specific conclusions.
Cows have property X (Argument 3)
Horses have property X
Badgers have property X
All mammals have property X
Cows have property X (Argument 4)
Badgers have property X
All dogs have property X
There are several models of category-based induction 
in the literature (Rips, 1975; Osherson et al., 1990; Slo-
man, 1993; Smith, Shafir, & Osherson, 1993; McDon-
ald, Samuels, & Rispoli, 1996; Heit 1998; Medin, Coley, 
Hayes, & Storms, 2003; Shafto, Kemp, Baraff, Coley, & 
Tenenbaum, 2005). These models differ in terms of their 
generality, their explanatory level (cf. Marr, 1982) and 
their degree of precision. The studies to be described here 
were primarily designed to test two particularly general 
and well-specified models, both of which were proposed 
to capture the process(es) involved in induction. Accord-
ing to Osherson et al.’s (1990) similarity coverage model 
(SCM), in adults there are always at least two processes in-
volved when evaluating a category-based inference. These 
are the calculation of similarity between the categories 
in the premises and the category in the conclusion, and 
calculation of the degree to which the categories in the 
premises cover the lowest level superordinate category 
that includes all of the categories in the argument. Similar-
ity is defined as the maximum similarity between the cat-
egories in the premises and the conclusion category, while 
coverage is defined as the average maximum similarity 
between the categories in the premises and available in-
stances of the inclusive category. According to the model, 
when the conclusion of an argument is specific, partici-
pants must generate an inclusive category. In cases such as 
these, the SCM posits three processes for  category-based 
induction.
In contrast, Sloman (1993) has described a single pro-
cess account of inductive reasoning. According to this 
model, the key phenomena of inductive reasoning may be 
captured by an associative process designed to calculate 
the amount of featural overlap between the instances in 
the premises and conclusion. For example, diversity is ex-
plained under this account by diverse premise categories 
tending to have, on average, greater featural overlap with 
the category in the conclusion. Similarly, featural overlap 
is increased when there are more categories in the prem-
ises. Thus, where the SCM posits two or three processes, 
the feature-based model (FBM) suggests that there is only 
one. In addition, this model does not distinguish, in terms 
of the number of processes required for argument evalu-
ation, between specific and general conclusions. So, in 
certain cases, the SCM suggests the involvement of three 
separate processes whereas the FBM consistently sug-
gests that there is only one.
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tween parts 1 and 2 ranging from .60 to .81. Test- retest consistency 
and internal reliability for the scale are high (Heim, 1970; Alexopou-
los, 1997). Correlations of .60 (Alexopoulos, 1997) and .69 (Heim, 
1970) have been found between the AH4 and Raven’s matrices.
Each participant completed 48 reasoning problems concerning 
different types of mammal (all of the reasoning problems used in 
this study and the next are presented in the appendices). Half of 
these problems were presented with a specific conclusion (e.g., all 
foxes, all deer, all tigers) and half with a general conclusion (i.e., all 
mammals). The problems were constructed in pairs, both members 
of which shared the same conclusion. This resulted in six items in 
each of the four conditions of the study. Participants were required 
to estimate argument strength on a percentage scale.
Half of the problem pairs were designed to measure sensitivity 
to diversity and the other half were designed to measure sensitivity 
to amount of evidence. The categories used in the pairs designed to 
measure sensitivity to diversity were taken from materials described 
by Osherson et al. (1990). The arguments in each pair of diversity 
items shared one premise while the second premise was varied. For 
the diverse item in each pair the category in the second premise was 
found by Osherson et al. (1990) to be dissimilar to the category in 
the first premise (the similarity scores reported by Osherson et al. 
are reported in Appendix A). The second premise in the nondiverse 
items was found by Osherson and colleagues to be similar to the 
category in the first premise. For example, Arguments 5 and 6 are, 
respectively, the diverse and nondiverse members of a pair.
Given the facts that: (Argument 5)
 Horses have Property F8.
 Seals have Property F8.
How likely is it that:
 All foxes have Property F8?
Response (0%–100%): __________%
Given the facts that: (Argument 6)
 Horses have Property K2.
 Cows have Property K2.
How likely is it that:
 All foxes have Property K2?
Response (0%–100%): __________%
Argument pairs designed to test for sensitivity to monotonicity 
consisted of either two or three premises and a conclusion. Two of 
the premises in the three-premise arguments were identical to those 
in the two premise arguments. Arguments 7 and 8 made up a mono-
tonicity pair with a specific conclusion.
Given the facts that: (Argument 7)
 Hares have Property A1.
 Whales have Property A1.
 Grizzly bears have Property A1.
How likely is it that:
 All cows have Property A1?
Response (0%–100%): __________%
Given the facts that: (Argument 8)
 Hares have Property J1.
 Whales have Property J1.
How likely is it that:
 All cows have Property J1?
Response (0%–100%): __________%
Because this was an individual differences study it was important 
that all participants rated the same arguments. Accordingly, we did 
not rotate content through conditions, and so the premise categories 
for the each of the conditions were different. Problems were pre-
sented in one of four pseudorandom orders constructed so that items 
from the same pair did not occur consecutively. Finally, all of the 
arguments concerned blank predicates. Each predicate was a differ-
ent combination of letters of the alphabet and numbers.
Stanovich’s argument has been accepted by many re-
searchers in the literature and there is now a substantial 
body of work investigating the relationship between cog-
nitive ability and thinking. For example, it is now known 
that normatively correct performance on a range of tasks 
ranging from Wason’s indicative selection task (Wason, 
1966) to Tversky and Kahneman’s (1983) conjunction 
fallacy is predicted by cognitive ability (see Stanovich 
& West, 1998a, 1998b; Feeney, Shafto, & Dunning, in 
press). Other phenomena where performance is known to 
be associated with ability include susceptibility to belief 
bias in logical reasoning (see Stanovich & West, 1998c; 
Handley, Capon, Beveridge, Evans, & Dennis, 2004), base 
rate neglect and pseudodiagnosticity (Stanovich & West, 
1998d), and framing effects (Stanovich & West, 1998b). 
These effects have been extended to reasoning in adoles-
cents where it is known that normative responding is more 
clearly linked to cognitive ability than is nonnormative 
responding (Klaczynski, 2001).
In the two studies described here, as well as rating the 
strength of arguments where evidence characteristics and 
conclusion specificity had been systematically manipu-
lated, participants also completed a measure of cognitive 
ability. The discovery of a statistically significant positive 
relationship between ability and sensitivity to evidence 
characteristics would suggest that a purely associative ac-
count, such as the FBM, is insufficient to explain the key 
phenomena of induction. It may also be possible, using an 
individual differences method, to shed light on the verac-
ity and generality of the processes that are posited by the 
SCM to explain category-based induction. In particular, 
we might test the model’s claim that in order to demon-
strate sensitivity to diversity and monotonicity when in-
ductive arguments have specific conclusions, people must 
generate a superordinate category that contains all of the 
categories in the argument. If the generation of an inclu-
sive category is an effortful but necessary process for the 
effect to be reliably observed, then we should find asso-
ciations between cognitive ability and rates of sensitivity 
to monotonicity and diversity with specific conclusions.
STUDY 1
Method
Participants. One hundred Durham University students with a 
mean age of 20 years took part in this study. Of the participants who 
declared their gender, 19 were male and 80 female.
Design. Participants attempted arguments with premises designed 
to assess their sensitivity to diversity and monotonicity, with general 
or specific conclusions. To facilitate an individual differences analy-
sis, I also took a measure of cognitive ability.
Materials. Each participant completed the AH4 (Heim, 1970) 
a test of cognitive ability that has been used in previous studies of 
individual differences in thinking (see Newstead, Handley, Harley, 
Wright, & Farrelly, 2004). There are two 65-item sections to the AH4, 
each of which is attempted in separate 10-min sessions. The first part 
is comprised of verbal items concerning direction, verbal opposites, 
numerical series, verbal analogies, simple arithmetic computations 
and synonyms. The second part of the test contains diagrammatic 
items requiring judgments about analogies, sames, subtractions, se-
ries and superimpositions. Heim (1970) reported correlations be-
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there were significant associations between AH4 scores 
and sensitivity to diversity (r  27, p  .008) and sen-
sitivity to monotonicity (r  .24, p  .02). However, the 
corresponding associations for arguments with specific 
conclusions were nonsignificant (r  .16, p  .11 and r  
.12, p  .23, respectively).
Discussion
The results of Study 1 contain several noteworthy find-
ings. In particular, although rates of sensitivity to diversity 
and monotonicity were above chance, this was only true 
for arguments with general rather than specific conclu-
sions. Adults, in much the same fashion as young chil-
dren (López et al., 1992), appear to have problems with 
specific conclusions. Given that Osherson et al.’s (1990) 
original demonstration of a monotonicity effect for spe-
cific conclusions involved only one argument, and that 
López et al. did not include an adult control condition in 
their experiments, perhaps adult sensitivity to monotonic-
ity and diversity in arguments with specific conclusions 
has been overstated. I will return to this issue in the next 
study.
A second finding of note is the positive and signifi-
cant association between cognitive ability and sensitivity 
to diversity and monotonicity for arguments with general 
conclusions. As measures of cognitive ability such as the 
AH4 are held to tax memory resources, and as associative 
Type 1 processes are supposed not to draw on such re-
sources, one interpretation of this finding is that a simple 
associative account is insufficient to explain people’s sen-
sitivity to certain inductive reasoning phenomena. How-
ever, although significant, the correlation coefficients re-
ported here are small, and care should be exercised in their 
interpretation. I will return to these interpretational issues 
in the general discussion.
STUDY 2
In Study 2, I attempted to replicate the results of Study 1. 
In the first study, I used different sets of categories in each 
of the four conditions testing for diversity and monotonic-
ity phenomena. In Study 2, I attempted to achieve more 
control over the materials by creating sets of items which 
could be used to manipulate evidential diversity, number 
of premises, and conclusion specificity.
Method
Participants. Twenty-two male and 93 female students of psy-
chology at Durham University participated in this study. Their mean 
age was 19 years.
Design. The study had the same repeated measure design as was 
used in Study 1. To facilitate an individual differences analysis, par-
ticipants also completed the AH4.
Materials. Participants completed 36 reasoning problems instead 
of 48 (see Appendix B for full list of problems used in the experi-
ment). Six problem sets were generated, each containing six indi-
vidual problems. Each set employed three premise categories (e.g., 
mice, dolphins, squirrels). The item in each set that was designed to 
test for sensitivity to number of premises involved presentation of 
all three categories in the premise of the argument. Diversity items 
involved presentation of just two, either a pair found by Osherson 
et al. to be similar, or a pair found to be dissimilar. Specific argu-
Procedure. Participants completed the reasoning problems and 
ability measure in large groups during lectures.
Results
Overall sensitivity to evidence characteristics. 
The results were coded by problem pair. The percentage 
of participants displaying each effect for each problem 
pair is reported in Appendix A. For the diversity items, I 
analyzed the proportion of problem pairs on which par-
ticipants gave higher ratings of argument strength to argu-
ments with diverse premises. For the monotonicity pairs I 
examined the proportion of pairs where participants gave 
higher ratings of argument strength to arguments with 
three premise categories.
Two dependent measures t tests revealed significant ef-
fects of conclusion type for diversity items [t(99)  4.05, 
p  .001] and for monotonicity items [t(99)  4.99, p  
.001]. The means from these analyses are presented in 
Table 1 where it may be seen that overall, we have obtained 
stronger evidence of sensitivity to both characteristics of 
the evidence for problems with general conclusions than 
for those with specific conclusions. When the conclusion 
category was general, single sample t tests revealed above 
chance responding for monotonicity items [t(99)  6.79, 
p  .001] and diversity items [t(99)  2.83, p  .01]. 
However, when the conclusion category was specific, 
responding did not differ from chance for monotonicity 
items [t(99)  .133, p  .5]. Sensitivity to diversity with 
specific conclusions was close to being significantly less 
than chance [t(99)  1.95, p  .06].
Individual differences analysis. The second analysis 
examined the relationship between scores on the cognitive 
ability measure and people’s sensitivity to diversity and 
sample size. Overall performance on the AH4 (M 95.6, 
SD  14.40) was close to the norm for a university sample 
(M  96.4, SD  15.01). Collapsed across conclusion, 
there were significant correlations between ability and 
sensitivity to diversity (r  .27, p  .007) and between 
ability and sensitivity to monotonicity (r  .24, p  .02). 
When collapsed across phenomenon, while there was a 
significant association between sensitivity to character-
istics of the evidence and cognitive ability for problems 
with general conclusions (r  .33, p  .001), the associa-
tion fell just short of statistical significance for problems 
with specific conclusions (r  .19, p  .07).
Detailed analysis of the relationship between perfor-
mance on the AH4 results for each of the experimental 
conditions confirmed the pattern of results described 
above. Thus, for arguments with general conclusions 
Table 1 
Mean Proportions (and Standard Deviations) of Pairs (Out of 
Six) From Experiment 1 Displaying Each Effect As a Function 
of Reasoning Phenomenon and Conclusion Type
Diversity Monotonicity
Conclusion Items Items
 Type  M  SD  M  SD  
General .58 .27 .66 .24
Specific .46 .22 .50 .25
  Average .52   .58   
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a university sample. Thus, we appear to have sampled a 
higher part of the distribution of AH4 scores in this study 
than we did in Study 1. This may be because the samples 
from Studies 1 and  2 are made up of students taking dif-
ferent degrees at Durham University. As there are consid-
erable differences in the academic entry requirements for 
some degrees, we might expect to observe corresponding 
differences in performance on measures of cognitive abil-
ity. Because there was substantially less variability about 
the mean AH4 score in this study than is the norm for 
the test, I report correlation coefficients that have been 
adjusted for restricted variance.1
Collapsed across conclusion type we observed a sig-
nificant correlation between the tendency to be sensitive 
to diversity and AH4 scores [r(adj)  .29, p  .005]. 
However, the overall association between sensitivity to 
monotonicity and cognitive ability only reached statistical 
significance [r(adj)  .24, p  .01], when sensitivity to 
monotonicity was assessed relative to nondiverse argu-
ments. When assessed relative to diverse arguments, sen-
sitivity to monotonicity was not significantly associated 
with ability [r(adj)  .08].
When we examine the relationship between cogni-
tive ability and performance in each of our experimental 
conditions, we find significant associations for diversity 
items with general conclusions [r(adj)  .23, p  .02], 
and for diversity items with specific conclusions [r(adj)  
.25, p  .01]. For arguments with general conclusions, 
sensitivity to monotonicity was associated with cogni-
tive ability whether such sensitivity was coded relative to 
diverse arguments [r(adj)  .22, p  .02], or relative to 
nondiverse arguments [r(adj)  .26, p  .005]. For spe-
cific arguments, associations with cognitive ability were 
weaker both when sensitivity to monotonicity was coded 
relative to diverse arguments [r(adj)  .1], or relative to 
nondiverse arguments [r(adj)  .14].
To explore the significant correlation between cogni-
tive ability and sensitivity to diversity on arguments with 
specific conclusions, we present the proportion of trials 
on which sensitivity was observed among participants in 
each decile of the distribution of AH4 scores from Stud-
ments were formed by using a specific category in the conclusion 
(e.g., all dogs). The same specific conclusion category was used for 
all of the specific problems formed from any one set. Mammal was 
the conclusion category for all general arguments. As was the case 
in Study 1, participants were asked to provide a percentage strength 
rating for each argument.
Procedure. Participants completed the AH4 and the reasoning 
task during the course of a lecture.
Results
Overall sensitivity to evidence characteristics. Each 
set of three arguments was presented with a general or 
specific conclusion. For each conclusion type, I coded the 
proportion of sets where the diverse argument was rated 
stronger than the less diverse argument. When coding for 
sensitivity to monotonicity, I coded the proportion of sets 
where the three premise argument was rated stronger than 
the diverse two premise argument, and the proportion of 
sets where the three premise argument was rated stronger 
than the nondiverse argument.
The mean proportion of sets displaying each effect, 
broken down by Conclusion, is displayed in Table 2. De-
pendent measures t tests revealed an effect of Conclusion 
for diversity items [t(114)  2.96, p  .005], for mono-
tonicity items compared to diverse arguments [t(114)  
3.06, p  .003], and for monotonicity items compared to 
nondiverse arguments [t(114)  6.03, p  .001].
Single sample t tests revealed above chance sensitivity 
to diversity when the conclusion was general [t(114)  
3.59, p  .001], but not when it was specific [t(114)  
.82, p  .41]. Sensitivity to monotonicity for arguments 
with general conclusions was significantly above chance 
whether sensitivity to monotonicity was defined as higher 
ratings for three premise arguments than for diverse ar-
guments [t(114)  8.48, p  .001], or as higher ratings 
for the three premise arguments than for nondiverse argu-
ments [t(114)  16.50, p  .001]. For specific arguments, 
sensitivity to monotonicity was also significantly above 
chance, again whether monotonicity was measured with 
reference to diverse arguments [t(114)  3.99, p  .001], 
or to nondiverse arguments [t(114)  8.65, p  .001].
Individual differences analysis. I analyzed the rela-
tionship between people’s performance on the AH4 and 
their sensitivity to diversity and monotonicity. The mean 
AH4 score in this study was 106.3 (SD 10.65). This is 
significantly higher ( p  .001) than the published norm 
(see Heims, 1970) of 96.4 (SD  15.01, N  726) for 
Table 2 
Mean Proportions (and Standard Deviations) of Pairs (Out of 
Six) From Experiment 2 Displaying Each Effect As a Function 
of Reasoning Phenomenon and Conclusion Type
Monotonicity Items
 
 
Conclusion
 
Diversity 
Items
Compared 
to Diverse 
Argument
Compared to 
Nondiverse 
Argument
Type  M  SD  M  SD  M  SD 
General .59 .27 .68 .23 .82 .21
Specific .52 .25 .59 .23 .69 .23
 Average  .56   .64   .76  
Table 3 
Mean AH4 Scores and Mean Proportions of Specific Conclusion 
Pairs (Out of Six) for Each Decile of AH4 Scores From Studies 1 
and 2, Where the Diverse Argument Was Rated Stronger Than 
the Nondiverse Argument
Study 1 Study 2
 Decile  N  AH4  DS  N  AH4  DS  
1st 10 67 .42 11 83 .44
2nd 10 79 .43 12 96 .43
3rd 10 87 .37 11 102 .53
4th 10 91 .48 12 105 .61
5th 10 96 .47 11 107 .53
6th 10 101 .45 12 109 .47
7th 10 103 .42 11 110 .48
8th 10 106 .42 12 114 .53
9th 10 111 .55 11 117 .52
10th 10 116 .57 12 120 .64
Note—AH4, mean AH4 score; DS, diversity sensitivity.
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was the case) but not with logical responding on deontic 
versions of the task (what ought to or should be the case). 
Newstead et al. observed this pattern with very high ability 
participants only. In studies with participants of moderate 
ability, the reverse pattern was observed. These authors 
also explain their findings in terms of the ability levels 
of their participants: phenomena that are very cognitively 
demanding will only be observed with a sample contain-
ing sufficient numbers of high ability participants. I will 
return to the implications of this finding for the SCM in 
the General Discussion.
Finally, when assembling the materials for Studies 1 
and 2, we used similarity ratings from Osherson et al. 
(1990) to select the premise categories for diverse and 
nondiverse arguments. One possible objection to the re-
sults of those studies is that for the diversity arguments 
with specific conclusions, we did not pretest the similar-
ity between each of the premise categories and the spe-
cific conclusion category (this objection does not apply 
to the monotonicity arguments presented with specific 
conclusions, as the SCM always predicts monotonicity 
with the addition of an extra premise category). Accord-
ing to the SCM, the strength of a two premise argument 
with a specific conclusion is comprised of a coverage 
score and a similarity score. Because we used Osherson 
et al.’s similarity data to select premise pairs, we have 
good reason for supposing that the coverage score will be 
higher for the more diverse item of each pair. However, we 
did not control for differences between similarity scores. 
The similarity score is given by the maximum similarity 
between the premise categories and the conclusion cat-
egory. Consider Arguments 5 and 6. If horses are more 
similar to foxes than are either seals or cows, then for 
each argument the similarity score is equal to the similar-
ity between horses and foxes. However, it is possible that 
seals or cows are more similar to foxes than are horses, 
and in this case, Arguments 5 and 6 would have different 
similarity scores. Perhaps, the lack of an overall diversity 
effect in Studies 1 and 2 for specific arguments, might be 
due to stronger similarity scores for the nondiverse pair 
than for the diverse pair.
To rule out the possibility of a confound, 67 undergrad-
uate participants at Durham University rated, on a scale 
from 1–9, the similarity between 20 pairs of categories. 
Each pair was comprised of a specific conclusion from a 
diverse/specific argument used in Studies 1 and 2, and one 
of the premise categories from that argument. The pairs 
were presented in one of two randomly determined or-
ders and the categories in each pair appeared in the order 
that they had occurred in the argument. The results of this 
posttest are presented in Table 4 where it may be seen that 
for six of the seven items used in the two studies, the cat-
egory common to both premise sets is rated more similar 
to the conclusion category than either of the other premise 
categories in the item. Because the SCM uses MAX simi-
larity to derive the similarity measure, it predicts that the 
similarity measure for both of the arguments in these six 
items should be identical.
The single item where the common category was rated 
less similar to the conclusion category than were either of 
ies 1 and 2. As might be expected given the size of the 
relevant correlation coefficients, the data are somewhat 
noisy. Nonetheless, an examination of Table 3 suggests 
some patterns. First, the decile scores suggest that in both 
studies, participants lowest in ability were sensitive to di-
versity at below chance levels. Because the higher ability 
participants in the 9th and 10th deciles of Study 1 were 
considerably more sensitive to diversity than were the 
lower ability participants in the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd deciles, 
the data for Study 1 is consistent with the predicted as-
sociation between sensitivity to diversity with specific 
conclusions and cognitive ability. However, an important 
difference between the studies is due to the highest ability 
group in Study 2 who are sensitive to diversity on almost 
two thirds of arguments with specific conclusions. This 
group stretches the difference in sensitivity scores be-
tween the most and least able participants. That such high 
rates of sensitivity are not observed in Study 1, suggests 
that it may be this very high ability group that is respon-
sible for the significant correlation observed in Study 2 
between cognitive ability and sensitivity to diversity on 
specific arguments.
Discussion
The results of Study 2 confirm and extend the results 
of Study 1. Once again we have observed above chance 
rates of sensitivity to evidential diversity for arguments 
with general conclusions. There is also stronger evidence 
in this study than in the previous study of sensitivity to 
monotonicity for both types of conclusions, regardless of 
whether one codes for such sensitivity by comparing the 
three premise argument to the diverse or to the nondiverse 
argument. In addition, for arguments with general conclu-
sions, sensitivity to the diversity and amount of evidence 
were both associated with cognitive ability.
A novel finding in this study is that for specific ar-
guments, sensitivity to diversity (but not to amount of 
evidence) is positively associated with cognitive ability. 
It is likely that we have observed such an association in 
this study but not in Study 1 because of the difference 
between the cognitive ability of the participants in each 
study. Recall that although the AH4 scores of participants 
in Study 1 were substantially lower than the scores of 
participants in Study 2, comparison across both studies 
of the AH4 scores by decile, reveals that sensitivity to 
diversity in the lowest ability groups was approximately 
equal. However, there was a very high ability subgroup 
in Study 2 whose members were sensitive to diversity 
on more arguments with specific conclusions than were 
participants in any of the other 19 decile groups across 
the two studies. Accordingly, the difference between the 
highest and lowest ability groups was larger in Study 2 
than it was in Study 1, which may help to explain why the 
correlation with ability was significant in the former case 
but not in the latter.
Newstead et al. (2004) report a similar finding in a study 
of Wason’s selection task. Stanovich and West (1998a) re-
ported that SAT scores were associated with the tendency 
to give the logically correct response on indicative ver-
sions of Wason’s task (concerning rules about what is or 
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the sample was lower. The correlation observed in Study 2 
is important because it suggests that some very able par-
ticipants were consistently displaying sensitivity to the 
phenomenon. So it is not the case the sensitivity to diver-
sity is never observed for specific arguments, although it 
does appear to be considerably rarer in adults than was 
initially supposed. However, it is possible that participants 
had difficulty with the diversity/specific items because 
they rated the arguments in random order. This may have 
increased the difficulty of the task, relative to the forced 
choice method often used.
The second claim to which our results are relevant is 
that category-based induction is primarily achieved via 
the operation of an associationist system (Sloman, 1993, 
1996). There is a strong argument in the literature on 
dual processes in reasoning that associations with cogni-
tive ability suggest the involvement of Type 2 processes. 
Such processes are said to be explicit, slow, sequential, 
symbol manipulating and thus, limited by basic cognitive 
constraints such as working memory. Type 1 processes, 
by contrast, are held to be fast, massively parallel, as-
sociative, and as a result, relatively independent of con-
straints such as memory. As working memory is known 
to be very important in determining performance on tests 
of cognitive ability (e.g., Carpenter, Just, & Shell, 1990), 
our finding of an association between a measure of ability 
and sensitivity to certain inductive phenomena suggests 
that the tendency to display those phenomena is, to some 
extent at least, dependent on Type 2 processes. It is im-
portant to state here that this finding does not question the 
view that reasoning based on similarity is often dependent 
on associative Type 1 processes. There are several sources 
of evidence suggesting that such reasoning is basic. For 
example, it appears to occur across cultures (see López, 
Atran, Coley, Medin, & Smith, 1997) and in very young 
children (López et al., 1992). However, our results suggest 
that perhaps the diversity and monotonicity effects rely on 
more than simple similarity calculations.
There are a number of reasons for exercising cau-
tion when interpreting the individual differences find-
ings from this experiment. First, the data is correlational, 
and the correlations we have reported, although statis-
tically significant, are not large. It is possible that the 
statistical variance shared by the ability measure and the 
reasoning task, is attributable to some factor other than 
general cognitive ability. That is, these correlations may 
not be indicative of the involvement of Type 2 reason-
ing processes in induction. However, in other areas of 
the literature, relatively weak, but statistically significant 
correlational data has subsequently been supported by 
the results of experimental studies employing a variety 
of experimental manipulations designed to differentially 
affect Type 1 and Type 2 processes (see De Neys, 2006; 
Evans &  Curtis-Holmes, 2005). Before strong claims can 
be made about the involvement of Type 2 reasoning pro-
cesses in  category-based induction, experimental studies 
of the effects on reasoning of secondary tasks and time 
pressure are essential.
Another difficulty is that for specific arguments in 
Study 2 we observed a significant association between 
the other two categories, was the cow, squirrels/elephants 
therefore deer item. However, as squirrels (the second 
premise category in the diverse argument) were perceived 
to be more similar to deer than were elephants (the second 
category in the nondiverse argument), this should have 
had the effect of making a diversity effect more, rather 
than less, likely. However, this item was least likely to 
produce a diversity effect in Study 1. In sum, the results 
of the posttest suggest that the low rates of sensitivity to 
diversity observed in Studies 1 and 2 cannot be attributed 
to systematic biases caused by greater maximum similar-
ity between the conclusion and premise categories in the 
nondiverse argument.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The results that have been presented here help us to 
evaluate two claims that have been made in the literature 
on induction. First, they are problematic for the claim that 
there is no psychological difference between the evalu-
ation of specific and general category-based inductive 
arguments (see Sloman, 1993). In both studies we have 
observed less sensitivity to the characteristics of the evi-
dence when the conclusion was specific rather than gen-
eral. This finding confirms a prediction derived from the 
SCM and is consistent with developmental findings show-
ing that sensitivity to diversity and monotonicity emerges 
for general arguments before it emerges for specific argu-
ments (see López et al., 1992).
However, another way to characterize our findings is 
that we have observed almost no sensitivity to diversity for 
arguments with specific conclusions. Viewed in this light, 
our results are problematic for the SCM, as it appears to 
predict a phenomenon that is not observed. However, in 
Study 2 we did observe an association between ability and 
sensitivity to diversity for specific arguments, although no 
association was observed in Study 1, where the ability of 
Table 4 
Mean Similarity Ratings, By Item, for the Categories 
Used in the Specific Arguments of Studies 1 and 2 
to Test for Sensitivity to Diversity
 
Premise
 
Conclusion
Similarity of 
Category to Conclusion
Category  Category  Common  Diverse  Nondiverse
Horse seals foxes 3.69 1.94 2.77
Horse cows
Cows squirrels deer 1.86 2.67 2.11
Cows elephants
Cows dolphins dogs 3.13 2.56 1.64
Cows rhinos
Chimps elephants goats 4.73 2.64 2.69
Chimps gorillas
Gorillas mice wolves 2.91 2.42 2.80
Gorillas rhinos
Squirrels seals tigers 3.09 2.92 1.94
Squirrels chimps
Mice dolphins dogs 3.58 2.42 2.63
Mice squirrels
Note—In Study 2, the third item in the table was replaced by the final 
item. The leftmost number in each row is the similarity score reported by 
Osherson et al. (1990) for the premise pair in that row.
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APPENDIX A 
Materials Used in Study 1
Diversity Items
Diverse–Specific Nondiverse–Specific Conclusion Percentage
horses seals (.37) horses cows (.93) foxes 55
cows squirrels (.49) cows elephants (.79) deer 37
cows dolphins (.26) cows rhinos (.79) dogs 46
chimps elephants (.53) chimps gorillas (.97) goats 55
gorillas mice (.37) gorillas rhinos (.65) wolves 43
squirrels seals (.27) squirrels chimps (.65) tigers 38
Diverse–General* Nondiverse–General
horses dolphins (.33) horses elephants (.80) 50
gorillas seals (.34) gorillas elephants (.65) 47
mice dolphins (.17) mice squirrels (.94) 72
dolphins elephants (.29) dolphins seals (.92) 71
rhinos seals (.32) rhinos elephants (.92) 55
cows seals (.38) cows gorillas (.59) 51
Monotonicity Items
Two Cases–Specific Three Cases–Specific
horses wolves horses wolves hippos dogs 32
zebras koalas zebras koalas hyenas hippos 51
hares whales hares whales grizzly bears cows 58
dogs cows dogs cows koalas boars 52
boars foxes boars foxes tigers horses 54
hippos deer hippos deer foxes grizzly bears 55
Two Cases–General Three Cases–General
boars koalas boars koalas horses 69
goats dogs goats dogs zebras 61
wolves cows wolves cows koalas 65
tigers grizzly bears tigers grizzly bears horses 76
hares hyenas hares hyenas boars 63
whales deer whales deer tigers 64
Note—The numbers in parentheses are the similarity scores reported by Osherson et al. 
(1990) for each premise pair. Percentage refers to the percentage of participants display-
ing the effect of interest on each item. *In all cases, the general conclusion category 
was mammals.
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APPENDIX B 
Materials Used in Study 2
% Participants Displaying 
Effect of Interest on Each Item
Monotonicity
Premises Specific General
* Specific Diversity
Diverse  Nondiverse  Three-Category  Conclusion  D  ND  D  ND  General  Specific
horses seals (.37) horses cows (.93) horses seals cows foxes 63 87 58 60 71 48
cows squirrels (.49) cows elephants (.79) cows squirrels elephants deer 73 80 50 63 53 63
mice dolphins (.17) mice squirrels (.94) mice dolphins squirrels dogs 60 83 62 76 70 55
chimps elephants (.53) chimps gorillas (.97) chimps elephants gorillas goats 63 87 49 81 73 71
gorillas mice (.37) gorillas rhinos (.65) gorillas mice rhinos wolves 75 83 70 70 44 42
squirrels seals (.27) squirrels chimps (.56) squirrels seals chimps tigers 74 72 63 63 44 33
Note—The numbers in parentheses are the similarity scores reported by Osherson et al. (1990) for each premise pair. D refers to the percentage 
of participants displaying the effect when strength ratings for the three-premise argument were compared to ratings for the diverse two-premise 
argument, and ND refers to the percentage of participants displaying the effect when the three-premise argument was compared to the nondiverse 
two-premise argument. *In all cases, the general conclusion category was mammals.
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